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MARINE POLLUTION SYMPOSIUM
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MARINE POLLUTION:
RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND "OTHER HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES"
E. D. BROWNt
Marine pollution has been defined as the "[i] ntroduction by man,
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious effects as
harm to living resources, hazard to human health, hindrance to
marine activities including fishing, impairment
of quality for use of
1'
sea water and reduction of amenities."
Another writer 2 has found it convenient "to regard the term
'marine pollution' as covering all human activities which may change
the environment and so affect the marine fauna and flora, fisheries,
public health or amenities. It includes therefore the effects of de-

velopment along the coast, offshore exploitation of oil and gas and
gravel extraction, as well as those other activities which come more
readily to mind, such as the discharge of sewage and industrial
effluents, oil pollution and the discharge of radioactive wastes."
Pollution of the sea by oil is not only the most obvious and widely
publicized source of marine pollution. It is also the source which has
tB. L., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer in International Law, University College London; Fellow,

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
1. Comprehensive Outline of the Scope of the Long-Term and Expanded Programme of
Oceanic Exploration and Research, as approved by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission (IOC), September 1969, Part I. 3 [UNESCO/IOC, Summary Report of Sixth
Session, Sept. 2-13, 1969, Annex IV, at 12, U.N. Doc. SC/MD/19 (June 1, 1970)]. See also
Joint IMCO/FAO/UNESCOWMO Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine
Pollution (GESAMP). Report of First Session, March 1969, GESAMP 1/11 at para. 12,
where an earlier version of this definition was approved.
2. Cole, Marine Pollution, 4 Oceanology International 69 (1969). See also U.S. Note to
Monaco, quoted in 4 Whiteman Digest 726 (1961): "the alteration of the waters which will
render or is likely to render waters harmful to public health, safety or welfare or substantially less useful for domestic, industrial and recreational purposes." See also Mouton,
The Impact of Science on InternationalLaw, 119 Hague Recueil (1966-Ill), 250 (1969).
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attracted by far the greatest volume of international legislation.'
From the long-term point of view, however, there can be little doubt
that, failing adequate safeguards, a much greater threat to the marine
environment will be presented by pollution from such sources as
sewage, persistent insecticides and herbicides, radioactive waste and
the many other toxic products of our industrial civilization. It is the
purpose of this paper to review the rules of international law which
have been, or are being, designed to govern such other hazardous
substances.
Before turning to a separate examination of, first, nuclear pollution and, secondly, marine pollution by 'other hazardous substances,'
it may be useful to consider briefly the basic position under international customary law and the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, 1958.
THE PRINCIPAL QUESTION

The principal question, under international customary law, may be
formulated thus: does international customary law contain rules prohibiting the use of the seas for the disposal of refuse or waste
material? Or, to put it another way, is freedom of waste-disposal one
of the freedoms of the high seas recognized by international customary law?
Can it perhaps be said that such discharges amount to an abuse of
the right to freedom of the high seas? The existence and scope of the
doctrine of abuse of rights in international law is at least controversial. 4 However, the essence of this argument, in a more generally
acceptable formulation, is to be found in the contention that the
right of user of the high seas is not an absolute right but a right of
reasonable user. There is little jurisprudence on the point: the award
in the Behring Sea Arbitration (1893) (no prohibition of cruel,
wasteful but not malicious sealing) suggests the absolute nature of
this right of user, whereas the judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (195 1) (requiring baselines to be moderate and reasonable and drawn in a reasonable
manner) might support an argument the other way.' More im3. For a study of the rules of international law-many of them of very recent originwhich have been devised to prevent or alleviate the effects of oil pollution, see E.D. Brown,
The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, chs. 4 and 5 (1971).
4. See, e.g., B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals, ch. 4, 1953; G. Schwarzenberger, I International Law 47, 198-99, 348-49 (1957)
and The FundamentalPrinciples of InternationalLaw, 87 Hague Recueil, ch. 5 (1955), and

F. Berber, Rivers in International Law, ch. 8 (1959).
5. G. Schwarzenberger, 1 International Law 348-49 (1957).
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portant, however, is the fact that, prior to 1958, the prolonged tradition of the courtesy of the sea and the mutually exclusive character
of some of these rights of user pointed to the "reasonable" formulation.6 Moreover, this view is confirmed by the Geneva Convention
on the High Seas (1958), the Preamble of which recognizes the conventional provisions as "generally declaratory of established
principles of international law."
Article 2 of the Convention makes no attempt to give an exhaustive enumeration of the various freedoms of the high seas but
does provide that those which it specifies and other freedoms "which
are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas." It
would seem to follow that, although prolonged State practice makes
it quite clear that waste-disposal in the seas is not absolutely forbidden, the unreasonable discharge of noxious materials into the high
seas is prohibited. But international customary law offers no more
precise rules for the determination of which materials are noxious
and what would amount to an unreasonable discharge.
So far as oil is concerned, Article 24 of the Geneva Convention on
the High Seas (1958) supplemented by Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958), offers further guidance.
Article 24 provides that:
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from
the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking
account of existing treaty provisions on the subject.

Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf contains two
relevant rules. Paragraph 1 requires that:
The exploration of the Continental Shelf and the exploitation of
its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference
with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of
the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental
oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication.
And, more specifically, Paragraph 7 requires that:
The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones
[around installations or devices on the Continental Shelf], all appropriate measures for the protection of the living resources of the
sea from harmful agents.
6. G. Schwarzenberger, Fundamental Principles 360.
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The way in which these rules-and especially Article 24 of the
High Seas Convention-have been further specified is dealt with elsewhere.7
Of more interest in the present context, the High Seas Convention
also provides further guidance on what the standard of reasonableness requires in relation to "activities with radioactive materials
or other harmful agents." Article 25 provides that:
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas
from the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any
standards and regulations which may be formulated by the competent international organizations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent international
organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of
the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents.
The significance of these provisions is further considered below.
II
NUCLEAR POLLUTION
A comprehensive study of the law relating to marine radioactive
pollution, including an examination of the question of liability,' is
beyond the scope of this article. Rather, the article is confined to a
brief statement of the sources of such pollution and of the measures
of control which have been proposed, and in some cases instituted,
to deal with the problem.
Significant increases in the natural radioactivity of the marine environment may arise from four sources:
1. the testing or use of nuclear weapons;
2. the use of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes;
3. the transport of radioactive substances; and
4. the disposal of radioactive wastes.
Attention will be focused mainly on this latter source.
A. The Testing or Use of Nuclear Weapons
An extensive literature already exists9 on the question of the
7. E.D. Brown, supra note 3.
8. See R. Lee, International Law Aspects of the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, 1967
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London).
One aspect which is currently being re-examined is that of the harmonisation of maritime
conventions on civil liability with the regimes established by the Paris and Vienna Conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage. See Draft Convention in IMCO Doc. LEG VIII/5,
Mar. 25, 1970, Annex and Report of the [IMCO] Legal Committee on the Work of Its
Seventh Session 14, 15 (LEG VII/l1, Jan. 12, 1970).
9. See G. Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order, ch. 10 (1971), and the literature listed in his Manual of International Law 521-22 (5th ed. 1967).
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legality of the testing or use of nuclear weapons on the high seas;
hence, little purpose would be served by rehearsing the various arguments here.1 0 It is, however, useful to be reminded that, as a result
of past practices-mainly before the entry into force of the Test-Ban
Treaty' I -"the amount of radioactivity released into the oceans
small percentfrom the peaceful uses of atomic energy is only a very
'
age of that already present from weapons fall-out.' 2
B. The Use of Nuclear Devices for Peaceful Purposes
Under Article 1 of the partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 5 August
1963:
1. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to
prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion,
or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction
or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space;
or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State
or control such explosion is conducted.
under whose jurisdiction
13
(emphasis added)
It would seem reasonable to assume that the use of nuclear devices
for peaceful purposes in the subsoil is in the same position as underground tests, that is, that they are conducted not "under water"
[Para. l(a)] but "in any other environment" [Para. l(b)]. They are
thus forbidden if they cause radioactive debris to be present outside
the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control
such explosions are conducted. Thus, an explosion conducted in the
subsoil of territorial waters would be quite legal so long as it did not
cause radioactive debris beyond the limit of territorial waters (a limit
extending from the upper limit of the State's airspace down through
the subsoil). On the other hand, since the subsoil of the high seas is
surely a place "outside the territorial limits of the State" concerned,
it would seem to follow that a peaceful nuclear explosion conducted
in the subsoil beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea would be
illegal even though no radioactive debris escaped to the superjacent
10. For an analysis of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in
the Subsoil Thereof, "commended" by the General Assembly on Dec. 7, 1970
(A/RES/2660 [XXVI), see E.D. Brown, Arms Control in Hydrospace (1971).
11. On the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, see further id.
12. F. Browder and P. Parsons, Control of Radioactive Waste Disposal,in IAEA, Nuclear
Law for a Developing World 231, 236 (Legal Series No. 5, 1969).

13. [1964] U.K.T.S. No. 3 (Cmd. 2245).
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waters or airspace. Though this seems the most logical interpretation,
it is also arguable that the intention was to place the subsoil of the
high seas in the same position as the "underground" of national
territories, thus banning only those explosions which caused radioactive pollution of the water or the atmosphere. Subsequent developments are certainly more in line with this reading of the Treaty.
For example, Article 1 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 1967 (the Treaty of
Tlatelolco), 4 specifically exempts peaceful use of nuclear materials
from its prohibition-a prohibition which extends to 200 miles from
the coasts of those Parties claiming a territorial sea of such breadth.
Similarly, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (adopted by
the General Assembly on the 7th of December 1970) does not extend to peaceful uses of nuclear devices.' ' Speaking in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the United States representative stated that, "The prohibitions of the Treaty are not intended
in any way to affect the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions or to
affect applications of nuclear reactors, scientific research, or other
non-weapon applications of nuclear energy, consistent with other
treaty obligations (emphasis added)."' 6 These "other treaty
obligations" include not only the above-mentioned Test-Ban Treaty
and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' ' but
also the obligation laid down in Article 25(2) of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958) to "cooperate with the competent
international organizations in taking measures for the prevention of
pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities
with radioactive materials or other harmful agents."' 8
It is likely that an international agreement will be concluded opening the way to the peaceful use of nuclear devices in inter alia the
14. Id. [1968] (Cmd. 3615).
15. E.D. Brown, supra note 10.
16. CCD/PV. 440 at 9.
17. July 1, 1968 [G.A. Res. 2373 (XXII), Annex (June 12, 1968); (1968) Cmd. 3683].
See especially Article 1.
18. A novel form of "activities with radioactive materials" manifested itself on Apr. 17,

1970 when the abortive Apollo 13 moon-flight brought back to earth a cask of 8.6 lbs. of
plutonium originally intended for a generator on the moon and now thought to be on the
bed of the Pacific some 600 miles from the point of splash-down. See also B. Cheng,

Liability for Spacecraft, 23 Current Legal Problems 217 (1970) and his Letter to the Editor

of The Times (London), May 7,1970.
Another new hazard will be presented by the use of radioactive Substances on Ocean
Data Acquisition Systems, especially the use of radio-isotope generators as power sources.
See further IMCO Doc. LEG VII/5, Nov. 26, 1969.

April 19711

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MARINE POLLUTION

227

subsoil of the seas and that it will incorporate safeguards to ensure
compliance with these earlier conventional obligations.' 9 It is clearly
desirable that one of the objects of any such agreement should be to
ensure that any resulting radiation will not, when added to that from
other sources, exceed the recommended permissible level for marine
radioactivity-which is referred to below.2 0
C. The Transport of Radioactive Substances
Prior to the introduction of international safety standards, the
19. See generally:
(1) Art. V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty:
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure
that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from
any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to nonnuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and
that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as
possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits,
pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclearweapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to
the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral
agreements.
(2) The Italian Government's Working Paper on Underground Nuclear Explosions
(ENDC/234, Aug. 23, 1968), which proposed "the prohibition of all explosions under the
sea-bed of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices for military purposes" with the
intention a contrario of opening the way for the use of nuclear explosions under the sea-bed
for peaceful purposes, subject to internationally agreed safety regulations;
(3) Resolution A/RES/2456 (C) (XXIII), Jan. 10, 1969 (reproduced in CCD/274), which
requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare a report on the establishment, within the framework of the IAEA of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international control;
(4) Resolution A/RES/2605 (B) (XXIV), Dec. 16, 1969, which invited the nuclearweapon States to continue to make available to IAEA full and current information concerning the technology of applying nuclear explosions to peaceful uses for the benefit of all its
members;
(5) Resolution A/RES/2665 (XXV), Dec. 7, 1970, expressing appreciation of recent
IAEA studies on the establishment of an international service for nuclear explosion for
peaceful purposes and requesting IAEA to continue and intensify its programme on the
relevent technology.
(6) Swedish Working Paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a Treaty Banning
Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (ENDC/242, Apr. 1, 1969, reproduced in CCD/274).
Draft Article 1(3) provides: "The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article
[prohibiting underground nuclear explosions] do not apply to explosions which are carried
out for construction or other peaceful purposes and which take place in conformity with an
international agreement to be negotiated separately."
20. IAEA, Radioactive Waste Disposal into the Sea, Safety Series, No. 5, 1961 (hereinafter cited as Report).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

recommendations usually observed in transporting radioactive substances by sea were those of the United Kingdom's "Blue Book."'2
In 1961, however, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
published the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Materials2 2 on the basis of the recommendations of the United
Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods. Revised editions of the Agency Regulations were published in
1964 and 1967.
In the meantime, in 1960, the International Conference on Safety
of Life at Sea had adopted the International Convention on Safety of
Life at Sea (the "SOLAS Convention," 1960),2" Chapter VII of
which contains provisions for the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous goods (radioactive materials constitute Class 7).
The Conference also requested the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO) to prepare, in collaboration with
the United Nations Committee of Experts, an international code for
the carriage of dangerous goods by sea, which the parties to the
SOLAS Convention were requested to adopt. 2 4 On the basis of the
labors of a working group convened by its Maritime Safety Committee, IMCO adopted the International Maritime Dangerous Goods
Code in 1966-Class 7 being concerned with Radioactive Substances.
The Maritime Safety Committee recommended IMCO members who
had taken part in the SOLAS Conference in 1960 to adopt the Code
as the basis of their national regulations.
D. The Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Article 25(1) of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas provides
that:
Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas
from the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any
standards and regulations which may be formulated by the com-

petent international organizations.
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958), in
addition to drawing up the above Convention, adopted a Resolution
on Pollution of the High Seas by Radioactive Materials. It was
recommended in the Resolution:
21. Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and
Explosives in Ships (1958).
See Ha Vinh Phuong, The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive

Materials, IAEA supra note 12, at 225-30.
22. Safety Series, No. 6, revised 1964 and 1967.
23. [1965] U.K.T.S. No. 65 (Cmd. 2812), entered into force May 26, 1965.
24. SOLAS Convention, Annex D, Recommendation 56.
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that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in consultation with
existing groups and established organs having acknowledged competence in the field of radiological protection, should pursue whatever studies and take whatever action is necessary to assist States in
controlling the discharge or release of radioactive materials to the
sea, in promulgating standards, and in drawing up internationally
acceptable regulations to prevent pollution of the sea by radioactive
materials in amounts which would adversely affect man and his
marine resources. 2 s
In October 1958, the IAEA set up an ad hoc Panel on Radioactive
Waste Disposal into the Sea under the chairmanship of Mr. H.
Brynielsson and the resulting Brynielsson Report2 6 is still recognized
as the authoritative guide on the marine disposal of radioactive
waste. The purpose of the Report was to consider the utilization of
the sea as a recipient of low- or intermediate-level radioactive wastes
and to offer recommendations which could serve as a basis of international agreement to ensure that any disposal of radioactive waste
into the sea would involve no unacceptable degree of hazard to
2
man. 7
It is necessary for an understanding of the Report's recommendations to have some knowledge of the types of waste which are produced and of the manner of their disposal. The Report itself provides
an admirably clear account of the basic facts:
The nuclear-energy industry produces high-activity, intermediate
activity, low-activity and so-called non-active wastes. The different
categories are not sharply delineated. "High-level wastes" have been
defined elsewhere [Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of
the United States, Hearingson IndustrialRadioactive Waste Disposal
(1959)] as those with "concentrations of hundreds or thousands of
curies per gallon" whereas "low-level wastes" have "concentrations
in the range of one microcurie per gallon." It is evident that between
these classes of waste must lie a wide range of wastes of intermediate
activity. The waste can be solid, liquid or gaseous; combustible or
non-combustible; aqueous or non-aqueous.
The range of properties of radioactive wastes is so great that two
different approaches to waste treatment exist. In general, the more
radioactive and dangerous wastes are subject to concentration and
containment while the less dangerous wastes are often diluted and
dispersed. By its nature waste disposal into the sea is predominantly
an example of the latter approach and would therefore be considered chiefly in terms of low-level wastes. However, to the extent
25. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/1. 56; [1958] (Cmd. 584).
26. Report, supra note 20.
27. Id. at 11, 12.
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that containment may be achieved, either by non-destructible
packaging or placement in sites possibly offering isolation over long
periods of time, it could be considered to be based on aspects of
both approaches. To some degree it might therefore be possible
eventually to extend sea disposals to wastes other than those of
strictly low activity.
The present practice of waste management is to contain the highand intermediate-activity wastes in storage tanks on land. Lowactivity wastes are discharged into the ground or, in some centres,
released through pipes to the sea, either directly or after treatment,
or they are fixed in concrete or in packaged containers, some of
which are disposed of in the sea.' 8

The Brynielsson Recommendations
The Brynielsson Report made thirteen recommendations,2 9 three
of which were directed to the operation of nuclear-powered ships.3 0
The remaining ten recommendations were as follows:
Recommendation (1)-Highly Radioactive Wastes
(1) At present, the release into the sea of highly-radioactive wastes
from the irradiated fuel cannot be recommended as an operational
practice.

Recommendation (2)-Wastes of Low and Intermediate Activity
(2) Wastes of low, and intermediate activity may safely be disposed
of into the sea under controlled and specified conditions.

Recommendations (3) and (4)-Safety Levels
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 77-79.
30. For a description of the nature of radioactive wastes from this source and the
capacity of the various maritime zones to absorb such wastes, see id. at 76-77. The Panel
made the following recommendations:
Recommendations 6, 11 and 12

(6) Release of radioactive wastes from nuclear-powered ships should be made
in such a way that there is no resultant limitation on man's harvest of products
from the sea.
(11) Radioactive wastes disposed of from nuclear-powered ships should be
entered in a record maintained on the ship and available for inspection by port
authorities. A suitable abstract of the record should be transmitted annually to
the authority of the country of the ship's registration for forwarding to the

Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) which should

work out, jointly with the IAEA, an effective registration and compilation of
radioactive-waste disposals from nuclear-powered ships.
(12) All disposals from ships in harbours and national waters should be in
conformity with conditions laid down by the local authority. In international
waters disposals should be in conformity with conditions specified in the
licensing of the vessel or provided by the appropriate international authority,
whichever is more restrictive.
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(3) The most recent Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection [ICRP] 3 1 should be used as a
guide for the assessment of the safety of proposed radioactive-waste
disposal into the sea.
(4) Only waste-disposal methods should be considered which limit
the radiation dose to that which involves a risk which is not unacceptable to the individual and the population at large. The interpretation is made that one twenty-fifth of the genetic dose to the
population as a whole, arising from the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, should be allocated to radiation received from marine
sources beyond national control.
At the time of the Report, the ICRP had recommended that the
genetic exposure of the whole population should be limited to less
than 5 rem 3 2 over a period of 30 years. The Report was thus
recommending that one twenty-fifth of this genetic dose, 3or 0.2 rem,
should be apportioned to the marine source of exposure.
Recommendations (5) and (7)-Disposal Sites
(5) All radioactive wastes disposed of into the sea, with the exception of those incidental to the operation of nuclear-powered
ships, should be released into designated disposal sites in conformity
with conditions specified for the particular site.
(7) Each waste-disposal site should be designated by a responsible
national or international authority. This authority should set out
conditions of disposal for the site adequate to ensure that no unacceptable degree of hazard to man arises. It should provide for any
necessary monitoring of the area to verify that safe conditions are
maintained, and should collect all necessary records of disposals to
maintain an adequate knowledge of the state of the disposal site.
Recommendations (8) and (9)-International Register of Disposal
(8) All authorities setting up disposal sites in the sea should provide
31. Footnote not in original.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection has long been the
recognized world authority on the problems of radiation protection, and its
recommendations have generally provided the technical basis of the various
regulatory measures in radiation protection ....

Several meetings held from

1950 onwards culminated in the well-known ICRP recommendations on radiological protection published in 1959, which were first revised in 1962 and
again in 1965 with an extensive review of its basic recommendations.
(B.N.C. Agu., Technical Basis of Regulatory Measures for Radiation Protection, IAEA, supra note 12, at 211.)

32. "The biological effects [of radiation] are dependent on the amount and nature of
radiation energy absorbed in the tissue. The biologically-effective dose, which is the product
of the total energy absorbed in the tissue and a factor representing the relative biological
effectiveness of the particular type of radiation, is designated in 'rem' and dose-rates in
units, such as 'rems per year.' "Report, supra note 20, at 14.
33. Report, supra note 20, at 74, 75.
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to a suitable international authority, information necessary to maintain an adequate register of radioactive waste disposal into the sea.
(9) The International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) should
maintain this register and should receive:
(a) Notice of the licensing requirements of all sea-disposal areas set
up by national authorities or by international bodies according to
agreement by the national authorities. This information should be
supplied to the Agency a sufficient time prior to the establishment
of any disposal site, to permit transmission to interested parties and
the receipt of any pertinent comments or representations.
(b) Annual reports on the state of such sites, including any change
in licensing conditions and information as to the quantity and general nature of disposals in the past year. An itemized report is not
necessary, but an estimate of the total activity, and the nature of the
more hazardous single disposals, regarding packaging, content, and
maximum activity, should be included.
(c) The monitoring programme and all relevant scientific findings.
Recommendation (1 0)-Monitoring Techniques
(10) The IAEA should provide for any necessary standardization of
monitoring techniques.
Recommendation (13)-Periodical Review
(13) The IAEA, in collaboration with other international organizations concerned, should at appropriate intervals review the problems
connected with radioactive waste disposal into the sea.
The recommendations of the Report have not so far been transformed into an international agreement as was originally foreseen,
but the full Report has been issued as Publication No. 5 of the IAEA
Safety Series under the title, Radioactive Waste Disposal into the
Sea.3 4 The Director General of IAEA subsequently convened a Panel
of legal experts under the Chairmanship of Professor Rousseau to
consider the administrative, organizational and legal measures which
might be taken on an international level on the basis of the Brynielsson Report and to advise him thereon. The Panel met four times
between 1961 and 1963 and its Report on The LegalImplicationsof
Disposal of Radioactive Waste into the Sea, April 1963 (the
Rousseau Report)3 1 included draft "Articles Proposed by the
Majority of Experts." It was intended that the draft articles should
first be adopted by the IAEA in the form of recommendations to all
States and that eventually they should constitute a Convention.
34. See also Safety Series, Nos. 10 and 11. See I & II IAEA, Disposal of Radioactive
Wastes (1960) and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes into Seas, Oceans and Surface Waters
(1966).
35. IAEA Doc. DG/WDS/L.19, June 14, 1963, restricted distribution.
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The Rousseau Report cannot be publicly commented upon since
its distribution was "Restricted." It is, however, common knowledge
that the absence of any subsequent action is due to the fact that a
minority of the experts on the Panel were unable to share the
majority view on the fundamental question of the permissibility
under international law of disposing of radioactive waste into the sea.
This minority, which included the Soviet expert, accordingly drafted
a separate set of articles embodying an absolute prohibition on
marine disposal of radioactive waste. Though the experts served in a
personal capacity, the view of the minority is in accordance with the
known opinion of the Soviet Union that any disposal of radioactive
material into the sea would be contrary to Article 25 of the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, as well as to the general principles of
international law.
Although, for this reason, no international conventional rules have
yet been adopted, marine disposal of radioactive waste does in fact
appear to be tightly controlled by national legislation, which is based
on ICRP recommendations and is in line with the major recommendations of the Brynielsson Report.
It has been reported 3 6 that, the United States Atomic Energy
Commission has, since 1968, ceased sea-disposal operations, though
substantial disposals were carried out in designated sites in the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans between 1946 and 1963.
In Europe on the other hand, the practice continues and in 1967
five Member States of the European Nuclear Energy Agency
(ENEA), Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, took part in an experimental operation designed to establish on an international basis the means by which solid radioactive
wastes could be safely disposed of at sea without damage to the
marine environment. Some 11,000 tons of solid waste in some
35,800 containers with a total activity of approximately 8,000 curies
were deposited at a depth of 5,000 metres in the eastern Atlantic.' "
More recently, a second Atlantic Waste Disposal Operation, involving
9,000 tons of solid packaged waste from seven States has been
mounted by ENEA.3 8
This development is particularly welcome because it ensures that
disposal will only take place on the basis of a very thorough hazard
36. C. Polvani, Radioactive Solid Waste Disposal into the Oceans, in Symposium on the
International Regime of the Seabed, Proceedings (J. Sztucki ed. 1970).
37. See ENEA, Radioactive Waste Disposal into the Atlantic (1967, 1968), which describes the preparations for the conduct of the experiment and gives a detailed hazard
assessment in Annex I, at 61.
38. ENEA, Eleventh Report on the Activities of the European Nuclear Energy Agency

(1970).
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assessment made by an international team; that internationally
agreed regulations will be developed; and that internationally accessible records will be maintained. This is certainly a useful interim
step forward. It is to be hoped, however, that further advances of a
similar nature will be made on a more universalist basis. As Dr.
Polvani has pointed out,
The method of dumping is scarcely under control either in the siting
of drums on the bottom, or in the identification after a long time of
the exact areas selected. The control is also lacking-and the relative
present knowledge is still scanty-on the rupture of drums, on the
velocity of diffusion and transport; in a word on the fate of the
content of the drums.... [I] n the case of the dumping in deep
basins it is rather difficult to say whether oceanographers are right in

evaluating in terms of centuries the residence times for deep waters
or other experts are right in considering mixing times in terms of a
few decades. 39
Given doubts such as these and only the vaguest information on
the future uses to which hydrospace may be put, it would seem to be
important to include in the current thinking about anti-pollution
measures proposals to develop further the work already done by the
Brynielsson and Rousseau Panels. It may not be unrealistic to hope
that present concern with environmental protection and the development of hydrospace will lead to the adoption of some such system of
international collaboration as was recommended by the majority of
the Rousseau Panel' '-and that it will be found to be equally applicable to the disposal of other hazardous substances. Suggestions
for the development of such a system will be found in Section IV of
this article.
In Section I of this article, it was suggested that the unreasonable
discharge of noxious materials into the high seas is prohibited and
the question was posed-what materials are noxious and what would
amount to an unreasonable discharge?
That radioactive substances are noxious materials needs no proof.
It is hoped, however, that the above exposition of the manner in
which disposal into the sea is controlled will offer guidelines for the
determination of what is unreasonable. It is suggested that any discharge carried out in disregard of the substantial safety recommenda39. C. Polvani, supra note 36, at 210.
40. For a brief account of IAEA's work on this question, including the establishment of
a register of disposals (first attempt, 1961, abandoned; second attempt, 1967, encouraging
response), see E. Hespe in British Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea, et al.:
International Conference on Oil Pollution of the Sea (Rome, Oct. 1968), Proceedings, at
392-93; and see U.N. Secretary-General's Report E/4487, Annex XI, paras. 153-64, Apr. 24,
1968.
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tions of the Brynielsson Report-even though these are not binding
per se-would be prima facie evidence of a breach of the required
standard of care. Should the international community succeed in
setting up a system of disposal licensing or, failing that, a system of
registration and monitoring, compliance with the regulations of such
a system would constitute a further requirement of the standard of
reasonable care.
III

MARINE POLLUTION
BY 'OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES'
In addition to oil and radioactive materials, a number of other
substances must be considered as actual or potential "hazardous substances" in relation to marine pollution. A recent report 4 1 enumerates ten major categories of marine pollution in addition to oil and
radioactive materials: domestic sewage; pesticides; inorganic wastes,
including heavy metals; petrochemicals and organic chemicals;
42
organic wastes, including pulp and paper wastes; military wastes;
heat; detergents; solid objects; and dredging spoil and inert wastes.
Work on conventional safeguards against such pollution is still at
an early stage and the purpose of this Section is merely to sum up
the present position under international law and to indicate the
direction in which conventional solutions may be developed.
These various materials reach the sea by a variety of routes: by
discharge through pipelines from land; by agricultural run-off; by
deliberate dumping; by exploration and exploitation of sea-bed resources; by transfer from the atmosphere; and by spillages from ships
carrying such hazardous substances as cargo. 4 3 The latter source is
perhaps most easily dealt with and will be considered first.
A. Other HazardousSubstances Transported by Sea
In November, 1969, at the close of the Brussels International
Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, two Conventions
were adopted, the International Convention relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties and the Inter41. IMCO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO/WHO/IAEA Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), Report of the Second Session, March 1970
(GESAMP Il/11 June 20, 1970) Annex V: Review of Harmful Chemical Substances 16
(1970). See also H. Cole, Marine Pollution, 4 Oceanology International 69 (1969).
42. Military wastes would include the nerve gas rockets disposed of on Aug. 18, 1970 by
the United States Army in the Atlantic: See the note on The Ocean Dumping of Nerve Gas:
A Case Study of "Operation Chase," appended to this paper.
43. See supra note 41, Annex V, at 2.
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national Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 4 4

Unfortunately, the Conference decided that neither Convention
45
should extend to noxious or hazardous substances other than oil.

In the course of the debate which preceded this decision, a variety of
views were expressed.
Those who opposed the extension to substances other than oil
argued that States with large shipping interests might be deterred
46
from ratifying the Convention unless it were confined to oil,
especially if it were uncertain precisely which cargoes might be subjected to its provisions. 4 7 Absence of an agreed list might also create
serious problems of liability and insurance. 48
On the other hand, it was argued that many governments might
hesitate to ratify an instrument confined to oil pollution on the

ground that it might appear to limit their right to deal with pollution
of their coasts caused by other substances.4 9 The New Zealand delegation considered that attention should be concentrated on the consequences of the spill rather than on the agent involved and argued

accordingly that no list of harmful substances was necessary.5 "
Similarly, Sweden suggested that the better course would be to refer
simply to pollution and leave it to the coastal State to decide
whether a particular case came within the Convention. 1
Eventually, the Conference decided to adopt a Resolution on International Co-operation concerning Pollutants other than Oil,' 2 a
device which the majority of delegations preferred to an optional

protocol (Additional Act)"
on other pollutants. This interim
measure recognized that any right of the coastal State to protect
44. For text of these Conventions, see Final Act of the Conference, IX International
Legal Materials (1970), at 20 et seq. and, for an analysis of them, see E.D. Brown, supra
note 3, at chs. 4 and 5.
45. Similarly, the Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea
by Oil, 1969 [IX I.L.M. (1970)], at 359, deals only with oil pollution. See generally note 3,
at ch. 4, section IV.
46. Bulgarian delegate, LEG/CONF/C.I/SR.1, at 9.
47. Soviet delegate, id. at 10.
48. German delegate, id. at 11 and Belgian delegate id. at 14.
49. U.K. delegate, LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.3, at 4.
50. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.1, at 12-13. Similarly, U.K. in observations on draft Articles,
LEG/CONF/3, at 6-7.
51. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.1, at 7-8.
52. See Final Act of Brussels Conference, IX I.L.M., at 20, 65 (1970).
53. For text of Additional Act (not adopted), see IMCO Note by the Secretariat on
Consideration of Future Work on Legal Problems relatingto Marine Pollutionfrom Noxious
and Hazardous Cargoes other than Oil, Annex, LEG VII/4, Dec. 4, 1969. Under this
optional Additional Act, Parties to the Public Law Convention, pending the entry into force
of a Convention concerning pollution by agents other than oil-or the extension of the
Public Law Convention to such agents-would have been able to agree to regard the provisions of the Public Law Convention as applicable also to pollution caused by all other
agents.
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itself against pollution by other agents was in no way affected by the
Convention 4 and recommended that IMCO should intensify its
work, in collaboration with all interested international organizations,
on all aspects of pollution by agents other than oil. The conviction of
many delegations that the provisions of the Convention were equally
appropriate for such other pollutants was, however, reflected in the
Resolution's further recommendation that Contracting States which
become involved in a case of pollution danger by agents other than
oil co-operate as appropriate in applying wholly or partially the provisions of the Convention.
The whole question is currently being further examined within the
IMCO framework.' s Until the results of these labors appear, the
position will continue to be regulated by international customary
law---so far as rights of intervention on the high seas are
concerned5 6 -supplemented on questions of liability by the existing
Maritime Conventions.

B. Other HazardousSubstances: Pollution via Other Routes
It was suggested above5 7 that international law forbids the unreasonable discharge of noxious substances into the high seas. In
some cases, such as the discharge of mercury compounds,5 I classification as an unreasonable discharge and identification of the offender might be relatively straightforward and international responsibility for the resultant damage might be established. In the great
majority of cases of pollution by "other noxious substances," however, where there are probably a great multiplicity of sources, proof
of a causal link and identification of the source will raise considerable difficulties. In these circumstances, it would be quite unrealistic
to expect international law to provide a post hoc remedy by establishing the responsibility of the tortfeasor State. It can, however, be
expected to make a contribution by evolving preventative measures,
as envisaged in Article 25(2) of the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas (1958), which calls upon all States to "co-operate with the

competent internationalorganizationsin taking measuresfor the prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above, resultingfrom any
54. See supra note 3, ch. 4, III.
55. Note by the Secretariat, supra note 53. The Sub-Committee on Marine Pollution of

IMCO's Maritime Safety Committee has undertaken a study of the technical aspects. The

IMCO Legal Committee, at its 7th session in January 1970, postponed further consideration
pending receipt of adequate technical information (Doc. LEG VII/11, at 5-7). See also
GESAMP, Report of the First Session (GESAMP I/ll, July 17, 1969), paras. 17-19 and
Annex V and loc. cit. note 1, paras. 16-19 and Annex V.
56. E. Brown, supra note 3, at ch. 4.
57. Id.

58. See Cole, supra note 2; Annex V, at 9, GESAMP II/11.
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activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents
(emphasis added)."
An impressive start has already been made in organizing such cooperation and valuable preparatory work is being done in a number
of inter-governmental and national organizations."s At the present
time, the object of the bulk of this work is to provide the technical
data in the light of which a regulatory regime may be designed. The
following brief account will give some idea of the scope and direction
of this work.
1. Long-Term and Expanded Program of Oceanic Exploration and
Research (LEPOR)
At its sixth session in September 1969, the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission approved a "Comprehensive Outline of
the Scope of the Long-Term and Expanded Program of Oceanic Exploration and Research" (LEPOR) 6 0 which had been prepared at the
request of the General Assembly of the United Nations.6 1
Part I, section 3 of LEPOR, which is devoted to marine pollution,
contains proposals for a number of scientific projects which "should
lead to the preparation of periodic comprehensive reports on the
health of the ocean. These would review the state of the ocean and
its marine resources as regards pollution, and forecast long-term
trends to assist governments individually and collectively to take the
steps required to counteract its effect." 6 2 One of these projects is
the establishment of a worldwide system of monitoring, a proposal
based on the conviction that "Losses or impairment of use through
contamination may only' ' be prevented by rational policies based on
research and monitoring. 6 3
59. For an excellent survey of the work on the international institutional level see M.
Hardy, International Control of Marine Pollution (J. Fawcet ed.). See also Smithsonian
Institution Center for Short-Lived Phenomena, National and International Environmental
Monitoring Activities: A Directory (1970), for an exhaustive presentation of the activities,
both current and planned, of 33 major international monitoring systems and some 2000

national and regional monitoring programs.
60. UNESCO/IOC. Summary Report of Sixth Session of IOC, Annex IV (SC/MD/19,
June 1, 1970), Sept. 1969.
61. Resolution 2467 D ((XII), Dec. 21, 1968, operative para. 4.
62. UNESCO/IOC, supra note 60, at 13.
63. Id. at 12. Supra note 60, Annex VI for the general plan and implementation

program of an Integrated Global Ocean Station System (IGOSS). Close collaboration is
envisaged between IOC's IGOSS and WMO's World Weather Watch (on which see U.N.
Secretary-General's Report on Problems of the Human Environment, Annex F, E/4667,
May 26, 1969). The International Decade of Ocean Exploration (IDOE) (1970-80) is the
initial acceleration phase of LEPOR. LEPOR will also include the Co-operative Investigation
of the Northern Part of the Eastern-Central Atlantic (CINECA) and the International Cooperative Studies of the Mediterranean Sea (ICSM).
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2. GESAMP
While the planning of the Long-Term and Expanded Program is
proceeding, advances are being made on another front in the accumulation of scientific data on marine pollution. A Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) was
set up in March 1969 to advise the sponsoring agencies (now IMCO,
FAO, UNESCO, WHO, WMO and IAEA) and the Group has already
held two sessions in March 1969 and March 1970. Three aspects of
its work deserve emphasis.
(a) Pollution from Exploitation of Sea-Bed.
The United Nations Secretary-General, in preparing his Report on
"Marine pollution and other hazardous and harmful effects which
might arise from the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and
the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, ' 6 ' relied on the Group's scientific advice. 6 '
(b) Promoting Effective Measures for the Prevention and Control
of Marine Pollution.
The Group has also assisted in the implementation of General
Assembly Resolution 2566 (XXIV) on "Promoting effective
measures for the prevention and control of marine pollution," operative paragraph 1 of which requests inter alia "[a] review of harmful chemical substances, radio-active materials and other noxious
agents and waste which dangerously affect man's health and his
economic and cultural activities in the marine environment and
coastal areas" and seeks views on the desirability and feasibility of an
international treaty or treaties on the subject.
Annex V of the Report of GESAMP's Second Session contains a
preliminary draft review of harmful substances, which not only
identifies and describes the principal categories of pollutants, but
also links these categories to the principal sources or means by which
the pollutants enter the sea, indicating their relative importance in
each case. The hope was expressed 6 6 that this review might assist
Governments in considering the desirability and feasibility of a treaty
or treaties for the prevention or control of pollution.
(c) Registration of Discharges and Spillages.
Perhaps the most significant pointer to the direction of things to
come is the Group's reference to the need for a system of registration
of discharges and spillages:
64. A/7924, June 11, 1970, presented to the Sea-Bed Committee and the General

Assembly pursuant to Res. 2467 B (XXIII) of Dec. 21, 1968.
65. GESAMP Report, supra note 41, Annex IV.
66. GESAMP II/11, at 7.
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23. The need under this heading is one for more international action
rather than for further scientific advice. The list of noxious substances and categories of pollutants that the Group had prepared
gave the scientific basis for developing a registration system. Such a
system was not an alternative to a monitoring system, but a necessary complement to it. It is necessary to be made known what is put
into the sea, either deliberately, accidentally or incidentally to other
activities. Registration of coastal injections is essentially a question
of national power and action, although international exchange of
information is needed. Pollution arising from ships and other equipment operating in the marine environment poses a rather different
problem.
24. The Group was informed that the IMCO Assembly at its sixth
session (15-30 October 1969), desiring to improve the detection of
offences (under the Oil Pollution Convention), which cause the discharge of significant or harmful quantities of oil into the sea, requested the Maritime Safety Committee to review the existing
arrangements for the reporting of incidents involving pollution by
oil. The Assembly had in mind the compilation of a record of such
incidents, centralized in one organization, for the furtherance of
work in this field and for the information of governments. The
Group hoped that this work would soon be fruitful, and that as soon
as practicable such reporting should also cover spillages of other
noxious substances, with a view to facilitating international measures
for the prevention and control of such pollution. 6 7
3. IMCO Conference, 1973
It is relevant to the above-quoted paragraph 24 to add that the
IMCO Assembly has decided to convene an International Conference
on Marine Pollution in 1973 to prepare "a suitable international
agreement for placing restraint on the contamination of the sea, land
and air by ships, vessels and other equipment operating in the marine
6
environment." 8
4. U.N. Conferences on the Human Environment and the Law of
the Sea
Finally, mention must be made of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment which will be convened in 1972 and of
the Law of the Sea Conference, provisionally scheduled for 1973.69
67. Id. at 11. The same approach is reflected in the Prospectus for the FAO Technical
Conference on Marine Pollution and its Effects on Living Resources and Fishing which met
in Rome in December 1970. Under the heading of "Scientific basis for international legislative control of marine pollution," it is commented that, "Control of pollution internationally will have to be developed through synthesis of information on existing national
legislation and arrangements for recording and monitoring waste disposal and accidents
leading to marine pollution (FRm/CMP/CIRCULAR 1, at 5)."
68. Resolution A. 176 (VI), Oct. 21, 1969.
69. The Human Environment Conference will be convened pursuant to A/RES/2581

April 1971]

INTERNATIONAL LA WAND MARINE POLLUTION

Even this brief survey of current developments indicates how
many institutions are now concerning themselves with the problems
of marine pollution and suggests the need for close co-ordination
among the various agencies. The General Assembly is clearly conscious of this need and in the above-mentioned Resolution 2566
(XXIV), 7 0 requested the Secretary-General "to complement reports
and studies under preparation, with special reference to the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
by: ... [inter alia] A review of national activities and activities of
specialized agencies of the United Nations and intergovernmental
organizations dealing with prevention and control of marine pollution including suggestions for more comprehensive action and improved co-ordination in this field."
Such improved co-ordination may be one of the fruits of the FAO
Rome Conference. 7' One of its stated general objectives is to "provide a synthesis which would be useful in the context of the Conference on 'Problems of Human Environment' to be convened in
1972..."72
It is too early to perceive more than vague outlines of the regime
for the prevention and control of marine pollution which will emerge
from the proposals and studies referred to above. It may, however,
be timely to consider, if only in general terms, some of the major
questions which the elaboration of a treaty regime will raise.
IV
A NEW CONVENTION?
On 13 December 1969 the General Assembly adopted Resolution
2566 (XXIV) requesting the Secretary-General, inter alia, to seek the
views of Member States "on the desirability and feasibility of an
international treaty or treaties" on the prevention and control of
marine pollution. On 17 March 1970 the Secretary-General
circulated a note verbale, inviting Member States to express their
views on this question and "to consider in [their replies] whether it
(XXIV) of Jan. 8, 1970 [IX I.L.M. (1970), at 427-30 and A/RES/2657 (XXV) of Dec. 7,
1970 and the Secretary-General's Report on Problems of the Human Environment (E/4667,
May 26, 1969)]. The earlier Report on Marine Sciences and Technology: Survey and Proposals (E/4487, Apr. 24, 1968) also deals with pollution (See Parts IE, IIA2 and 3, IIID and
Annex XIV).
The General Assembly's decision to convene a Law of the Sea Conference is embodied in
A/RES/2750 (XXV) of Dec. 17, 1970. ".. . using fully the opportunity provided by the
1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to further its work" (Preamble), the Law of the Sea Conference would deal inter alia, with "the preservation of the
marine environment (including, inter alia, the prevention of pollution)..." (para. 2).

70. Id. at § 2(2)(b).
71. Supra note 67.

72. Id. at4.
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is desirable and feasible that any international treaty or treaties to be
adopted should relate to all forms of marine pollution or to certain
forms of marine pollution only, and if, in certain circumstances,
regional treaties should complement such global treaties, if any, as
may be adopted." Replies were requested by 31 August 1970.
In this, the final section of this article, it is proposed to raise some
of the key questions which will have to be answered before any such
treaty regime may be constructed and to offer some tentative suggestions. The questions to be considered are these: (1) the scope of
the system ratione materiae; (2) the essential elements of a system
for the prevention and control of marine pollution and (3) the division of responsibilities between national, regional and global institutions.
A. Scope ratione materiae
Is the new system to embrace all marine pollutants or only some
of them and, if the former, is it necessary to have specialized regimes
within the general framework for particular types of pollutant or
particular pollution routes?
Irrespective of the type of pollutant or of the route by which it
enters the marine environment, it is desirable that there should be a
central international data bank on all pollutants entering the sea and
an internationally co-ordinated system of reporting and monitoring
to obtain such data. In these respects oil and radioactive waste must
be covered by the new treaty.
On the other hand, it has to be remembered that though a great
deal remains to be done, the law on the prevention and control of oil
pollution is considerably further advanced than that concerning
other sources of marine pollution. Three major international conventions have recently been concluded on this question and a model for
regional co-operation has also been established. 7 The better course
would seem to be not to tamper with the foundations of these
treaties but to work for their widespread ratification and for the
adoption of further restrictions and safeguards. In relation to intentional oil discharges by vessels on the high seas, one possible further
restraint has been suggested recently by the United States delegation
73. (1) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,

1954, as extensively amended in 1962 and 1969. For a composite text of the Convention as
amended in 1962 and 1969, see IX I.L.M., at 1 (1970);
(2) International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969 [IX I.L.M., at 25 (1970)];
(3) International Convention on Civil liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 [IX
I.L.M., at 45 (1970)] ;
(4) Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil,
1969 [IX I.L.M., at 359 (1970)]. For a full analysis of these Conventions see supra note 3.
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to the Brussels Oil Spills Conference of NATO's Committee on the
Challenges of Modem Society. 7 4 A second question which is under
consideration at the moment is the need to ensure that the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed and subsoil
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction will be conducted with
adequate concern for the protection of the marine environment. 7
As regards other hazardous substances (excluding radioactive substances) carried as cargo, it would again seem desirable to have questions of civil liability and rights of intervention against offshore
casualties dealt with by an extension to such substance of the
Brussels Conventions of 1969, 7 6 if this proves possible. Since, however, it is clearly not possible to extend the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954-1969) 7 1 to
such cargoes, intentional dumping from such transporters might well
be subject to the provisions of the new treaty.
As regards radioactive waste, the time may now be opportune to
re-examine the proposals of the Rousseau Panel 78 and to consider
the feasibility of their incorporation into the new conventional
system, with separate provision if necessary for the peculiar problems
raised by this type of pollutant.
B. EssentialElements of the System
A distinction must be made between run-off from land and ocean
dumping.
1. Run-off from Land
The establishment and enforcement of water quality standards
within national boundaries are of course primarily matters of
domestic jurisdiction at present and likely to remain so. Since, however, an excessive run-off of DDT, mercury or any other harmful
substance may cause serious marine pollution, there is clearly some
role for an international organization. Internationally co-ordinated
monitoring will supply evidence that (internationally prescribed?)
74. U.S. Transportation Secretary Volpe proposed inter alia: "that NATO nations resolve
to achieve-by mid-decade-a complete halt to all intentional discharge of oil and oily wastes
into the oceans by tankers and other vessels" and that they "recommend" a number of
immediate steps toward abatement of both accidental spillage and intentional discharges.
See text in Department of Transportation press release of Nov. 2, 1970.
75. See generally the Report of the Secretary-General on Marine Pollution and Other
Hazardous and Harmful Effects Which Might Arise from the Exploration and Exploitation
of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction (A/7924, June 11, 1970), prepared pursuant to G.A. Res. 2467 B
(XXIII) Dec. 21, 1968.

76. Supra note 73, (2) and (3).
77. Id.
78. Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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danger levels (or administrative alert levels?) have been reached.
Beyond this the role of international institutions is very much a
question of political feasibility. Assuming that evidence has been
gathered that a pollution danger level reached in a particular area has
been caused by run-off from a particular State, the following phases
may be suggested, proceeding from the lower to the higher degrees of
international integration.
First, provisions might be made for mere notification to the State
concerned of the monitored effects on the marine environment.
Secondly, it might be required of a party to the treaty that, on
receipt of such notification, it investigate and report on the causes of
the pollution and indicate the remedial steps which it intended to
take. Such a State would have the option of calling upon an international body of experts7 ' for advice and assistance.
Thirdly, and in the event of an unsatisfactory response in phase 2,
provision might be made for obligatory investigation by the said
international body of experts which would be empowered to make
recommendations to the State.
An obvious but politically unattractive fourth phase would be to
make such recommendations binding.
Prior to actual negotiation, it would be unduly speculative to do
more than raise the questions whether any of these restraints are
politically acceptable and whether some of the phases might perhaps
be more acceptable in regional groupings.
2. Ocean Dumping
A quite separate part of the treaty system would be required to
deal with ocean dumping. What are the essential elements of such a
system? Without prejudice to the question whether any particular
element should fall within or outwith the domestic jurisdictions, it is
suggested that the following must be included:' 0
1. A ban on all unlicensed dumping;
2. A ban on dumping of materials clearly identified as unacceptably

harmful in any quantities;
3. A research program to determine the effects of materials on
which the evidence is inconclusive and an interim phasing-out
policy on the disposal of such materials pending the outcome of

the research;
79. It is envisaged that such a body would also function in relation to ocean dumping.
80. Many of these elements are adopted from the Report of the (U.S.) Council on
Environmental Quality, Ocean Dumping, A National Policy (1970). President Nixon has
endorsed the Council's recommendations and undertaken to submit specific legislative proposals to implement them to the next Congress (Weekly Compilationof PresidentialDocuments, Oct. 12, 1970, at 1348).
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4. A system of licensed dumping for other materials subject to compliance with standards set in accordance with internationally
agreed criteria;
5. A system of reporting, monitoring and recording;
6. Enforcement.
Division of responsibilities between the domestic and international
arenas and the international institutional requirements of the system
are further considered below.
C. Division of Responsibilities
Taking the above six elements in turn, where is responsibility to
lie-in a national, regional or global institution? The basic distinction
is between functions which must be performed internationally and
those which may remain in the domestic arena, though there may of
course be domestic functions which States may wish to perform in
regional co-operation and global functions which are more efficiently
performed through regional sub-divisions.
1. Ban on Unlicensed Dumping
Such a ban would be prescribed on two levels, that of the Treaty
which would bind States to implement such a ban and that of the
legislation under which the ban would be enforced on the domestic
level.
2. Ban on Identified Materials
Here too the ban would operate through national legislation but
there would have to be machinery on the international level to make
the initial identification of materials regarded as "unacceptably
harmful in any quantities" and to keep this question under continuing review. One convenient solution might be to entrust this task
to the recently instituted inter-agency Joint Group of Experts on the
Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP). 8 ' Whatever body
might deal with this question, the Treaty would have to provide for
its composition and voting rules and require States Parties to translate its findings into prohibitions under national legislation.
3. Research Program and Phase-Out of Suspect Substances
The same expert group might be entrusted with this research and
with the establishment of a phase-out policy to be implemented
through national legislation.
4. License System and International Standards
81. Supra note 63 and subsequent text.
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It is suggested that the operation of the licensing system should be
left to governments but that the legislation under which it functions
should be drawn up in accordance with treaty-prescribed international criteria. It is perhaps worth emphasizing in this connection
that there is no need to have exhaustive scientific information on the
processes of marine pollution before such criteria can be usefully
established. Scientists may well be unable to recommend methods,
quantities and frequencies of disposals which would be universally
applicable for a particular substance or to establish one set of disposal criteria applicable to all sites, but this would not prevent them
from drawing up a set of disposal criteria in accordance with which a
hazard assessment might be made in relation to a particular disposal
operation. The approach recommended by the (United States)
Council on Environmental Quality offers a useful model for incorporation in a treaty system. The Council recommended in their
Report on Ocean Dumping 2 that a permit should be required from
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for all
ocean dumping and that the Administrator, in setting standards for
disposing of materials in the ocean, should be guided by inter alia the
following criteria:
1. Present and future impact on the marine environment, human
health, welfare and amenities.
2. Irreversibility of the impact of dumping.
3. Volume and concentration of materials involved.
4. Location of disposal, i.e.,
depth and potential impact of one loca8
tion relative to others. 3
In addition, the Council recommended policies on a number of
specific types of waste presently being dumped and identified major
research areas where serious information deficiencies exist. 4
The international prescription by treaty of similar criteria and
policies for incorporation in national legislation would permit major
advances to be made while research continues.
5. A System of Reporting, Monitoring and Recording
Both pollution research and pollution prevention and control require data on the waste substances which enter the seas. It is essential
therefore, that national pollution administrations should report to a
central data bank full details of all disposal operations licensed by
them, including details of substance dumped, disposal site, hazard
assessment, prescribed conditions and post-disposal monitoring.
82. Supra note 80.
83. Id. at vi.

84. Id.at vi-viii.
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Secondly, it is imperative that an international globe-wide environmental monitoring system be set up, and that its output be recorded
in the central data bank. This is not the place to give a detailed
account of the various schemes which are now under discussion. It

must suffice to say that both at the national level and in the specialized agencies detailed proposals are already under discussion for both

an international monitoring system and a world environmental institute, the purpose of the latter being to act as a global environmental
research center and clearinghouse for environmental information."
6. Enforcement
Experience suggests that at the present time attempts to empower
either an international agency or the naval forces of other States with
jurisdictional powers over vessels on the high seas will not be accept-

able to the great majority of maritime States.8 6 Varying degrees of
jurisdiction over vessels of foreign registry have been provided for in
maritime conventions in the past, a few fishery conventions even
providing for seizure and arrest of vessels alleged to have infringed
the treaty rules. Even in those cases, however, penal jurisdiction
remained with the flag State of the offending vessel. Moreover, the
formula incorporated in the International Convention for the Preven-

tion of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954-69) does not encourage
optimism. Under Articles IX and X of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended
in 1962, the appropriate authorities of the contracting States may
inspect and take true copies of entries made in the oil record book
with which certain ships, including tankers, are required to be pro85. See Directory, supra note 59 and R. Citron, The Establishment of an International
Environmental Monitoring Program, a Plan for Action, Office of Environmental Sciences,
Smithsonian Institution (1970). Dr. Citron's article provides a very useful summary of
current, planned, and proposed environmental programs. The planned programs include, in
addition to those referred to in note 63, the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP)
co-ordinated by the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO); the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) Program, which is
being developed by UNESCO and a Global Environmental Health Monitoring Program
which WHO plans to establish.
Three of the more advanced proposals for an international environmental monitoring and
research program are an International Center for the Environment (ICE) proposed by the
Special Committee on the Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) of ICSU; a Global Network for Environmental Monitoring (GNEM) proposed by the U.S. National Committee for
the International Biological Program; and a World Environment Institute (WEI) which the
U.S. Senate has urged the United States to propose at the 1972 Human Environment
Conference (S. Res. 399, introduced by Sen. Magnuson, passed Oct. 9, 1970). For further
details see Citron at 3-8 and 51-66.
86. See for a survey of past practice, E. D. Brown, Law and Order on the Continental
Margin and the Ocean Floor, Quiet Enjoyment: Arms Control and Police Forces for the
Ocean (E. Young ed. 1971).
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vided. Such action may only be taken in respect of foreign ships,
however, when in a port of the inspecting State. Such copies are
admissible in any judicial proceedings as evidence of the facts stated
in the entry. Proceedings may only be taken, however, by the flag
State, though other parties may furnish it with evidence of an alleged
contravention. 8 7
The more far-reaching rights of interference with foreign vessels
permitted under the recently adopted International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties (1969) are of course available only following a casualty. 88
In the light of recent practice it would probably be realistic to
assume therefore that enforcement of compliance with internationally prescribed municipal legislation would be left to the existing national enforcement agencies.
A second enforcement problem which must be considered is that
of ensuring compliance by States with their treaty obligations. If a
State fails in its obligation to report disposals effected under license
or to incorporate treaty-prescribed prohibitions in its legislation or to
enforce its legislation, what remedies should be available? If the object is restitutio in integrum (in the form of compliance with treaty
obligations) rather than a declaration of tortious conduct or the
award of compensation (which would normally be very difficult to
quantify in any event) it would be desirable to provide for a multilevel conflict settlement procedure with emphasis on the negotiation
and conciliation phases rather than on arbitration or judicial
settlement. 8 9

87. Id. and supra note 3, at ch. 4.
88. Id.
89. See for example, the formula adopted in Article VIII and Annex of the International

Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties
(1969) and supra note 3.
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APPENDIX
THE OCEAN DUMPING OF NERVE GAS:
A CASE STUDY OF 'OPERATION CHASE'
I
THE FACTS
On 18 August 1970, the United States Army dumped on the bed of the Atlantic Ocean
418 concrete vaults overlaid with steel plates and containing rockets loaded with nerve gas.
The planned disposal site was at 29' 20' N, 760 O'W, a charted munitions disposal area,
approximately 245 nautical miles east of Cape Kennedy, 160 nautical miles north-northeast
of Powell Cay in the Bahamas and 220 nautical miles beyond the geological continental
shelf.'
As required by section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act 1969,2 the Department of the Army submitted an "Environmental Impact Statement" to the Council on
Environmental Quality, indicating that 'Operation Chase' had been the object of study by
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), an independent committee of experts, the Gross Committee, convened on the recommendation
of NAS, and the Department of Interior. NAS was clearly reluctant to recommend ocean
disposal and advised expert consideration of any practically feasible alternatives.3
The Gross Committee, which was established for this purpose, presented two reports, the
first of which recommended disposal by "use of a nuclear device" or "if the above cannot
be accomplished, to sea dump them in as deep water as possible." 4
The AEC having advised that nuclear destruction would be unsatisfactory,5 the Gross
Committee recommended in a "Follow-Up Report" of 15 May 1970 that the vaults should
be shipped "without delay to a suitable ocean port" to be "loaded on a surplus marine hulk
which will then be towed to a suitable ocean depth and be scuttled." 6
Finally, a Department of Interior Working Group, though against ocean disposal of
chemical materials in general, also recognized in their Second Report of 13 November 1969
the necessity for ocean disposal in this particular case. 7
Attempts by the Governor of Florida and the Environmental Defense Fund to obtain a
restraining order in the United States courts were unsuccessful and the operation was
completed on 18 August 1970.
On 26 October 1970 the Pentagon announced 8 that photographs had shown that the
hulk in which the vaults were sunk had not broken up on settling on the ocean bed; there
was no evidence of dead and dying organisms in the vicinity of the hulk and tests for nerve
gas (including samples taken directly over the open holds of the vessel) were negative. The
United States Navy is to continue to make periodic tests.
The threatened dumping operation raised a storm of protest throughout the world but it
appears that Governments were, in general, not prepared to lodge formal protests. Iceland
was reported to have made a formal protest9 but, despite strongly worded requests for
1. Hearings on Dumping of Nerve Gas Rockets in the Ocean Before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 127 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]; see also Ludwigson, Nerve Gas, Oceans, Nov.-Dec.,

1969, at 72-75; and N.Y. Times, Aug. 4-19, 1970 (on campaign to halt the operation).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § § 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (Supp. 1971).
3. 1970 Hearings at 101.

4. Id. at 104.
5. "These obsolete chemical munitions can be reliably destroyed by an underground
nuclear explosion" but "about 15 months will be required from project authorization.... This schedule is not consistent with the desired August 1970 disposal date." Id. at
107.
6. Id. at 126.
7. Id. at 117.
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1970, at 15, col. 1.
9. The Times (London), Aug. 17, 1970, at 1, col. 1.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

action by the Bahamas Government,' o the United Kingdom Government consented only to
dispatch a three-man team of experts to the United States to assess the hazard-and then
were unable to fault the reports referred to above.' ' The United Nations Secretary-General
was less diplomatic and issued a statement' 2 strongly condemning the United States action
as "clearly contraven[ing]" a General Assembly Resolution and as running "counter to the
provisions of" Article 25(2) of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958)-charges
which were promptly rejected by the State Department.

II
THE LAW
The object of focussing attention on 'Operation Chase' at this time is neither the
conviction that its conduct amounted to a clear and serious breach of international law nor
the expectation that its long-term results will significantly damage the marine environment.
The purpose is rather two-fold: first, to illustrate by reference to a concrete case, the
vagueness and inadequacy of the present law and the difficulty of finding any agreed criteria
or procedures by reference to which to measure the reasonableness and legality of the
marine disposal of a harmful agent; and secondly to make available a post hoc dispassionate
analysis of the international legality of this operation, which may be more helpful in the
event of similar incidents arising in the future than some of the understandably heated ad
hoc reactions.
A useful starting point is provided by the Secretary-General's statement of 7 August
1970. The Secretary-General's first charge was that
This decision, in the Secretary-General's view, clearly contravenes General
Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII). This resolution points out, inter alia, "the
importance of preserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof.., from actions and uses which might be detrimental to the common
interests of mankind."
To see the Secretary-General's assertion in perspective, it must be recalled that the
passage quoted is taken from the preamble of the Resolution by which the General
Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee to study the peaceful uses of the sea-bed, etc.
The Assembly merely expressed itself to be "mindful also of the importance..." of this
question and it is, therefore, somewhat misleading to speak of a 'contravention' of this
Resolution-all the more so since even a Resolution formulated in more mandatory style
would have possessed no more than recommendatory force. It remains true, nonetheless,
that the United States, by its failure until the last minute' ' to consult or co-operate with
any authority beyond the domestic arena, acted contrary to the clearly expressed moral
expectations of the community of States. Is it, however, possible to go further and regard
Operation Chase as involving a breach of a firm legal obligation?
Although the Secretary-General made no direct reference to Article 2 of the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas (1958), the legality of Operation Chase has to be assessed by
reference to its requirement that the freedoms of the high seas (including by implication
freedom of waste disposal) must be exercised "with reasonable regard to the interests of the
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas."
It is apparent from the Congressional Hearings on Operation Chase that the United States
Army had been less than sensitive to either domestic or international public opinion in
planning what, for it, was no doubt the latest of a series of operations for the marine
disposal of unwanted munitions. As a result, very little interdepartmental consultation
seems to have been initiated prior to the 'House' Hearings in May 1969 on the "Inter10.
11.
12.
13.

The Guardian, Aug. 5, 1970, at 2, cols. 1, 2.
The Times (London), Aug. 15, 1970, at 4, cols. 2, 3.
Press Release SG/SM1314, Aug. 7, 1970.
See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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national Implications of Dumping Poisonous Gas as Waste into Oceans."' ' In the course of
these hearings, a State Department officer, Dr. Pollack, after emphasizing the recency of
international awareness and concern over environmental pollution, cited the initiative of the
United States Government in the United Nations as indicative of American policy on marine
pollution.' On 28 June 1968, the United States proposed to the Ad Hoc Sea-bed Committee "a principle applicable to the development of a regime for the deep ocean floor which
provided:"
In the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor States and their nationals:
(a) Shall have reasonable regard for the interests of other States and their
nationals;
(b) Shall avoid unjustifiable interference with the exercise of the freedom
of the high seas by other States and their nationals, or with the conservation
of the living resources of the seas, and any interference with fundamental
scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication;
(c) Shall adopt appropriate safeguards so as to minimize pollution of the
seas and disturbance of the existing biological, chemical and physical process
and balances; each State shall provide timely announcement and any necessary
amplifying information of any marine activity or experiment planned by it or
its nationals that could harmfully interfere with the activities of any other
State or its nationals in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor. A
State which has reason to believe that a marine activity or experiment planned
by another State or its nationals could harmfully interfere with its activities or
those of its nationals in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor may
request consultation concerning the activity or experiment;' 6
Dr. Pollack went on to say that:
These same considerations [which prompted U.S. interest in the international
aspects of environmental pollution] have led the U.S. Government to incorporate in the procedures to be followed in connection with the CHASE
operation under consideration, a provision for appropriate notification to
other nations. A decision on the exact procedure to be followed has not yet
been made. I wish to make clear that this notification is not contemplated
because the U.S. Government has concluded that the sinking of the munitions
under discussion has the potential of harmfully interfering with the activities
of other States ....
Rather we believe such notification would be consistent
with the spirit of the principle, and would in any case be the kind of behavior
we would like to see followed by other States contemplating similar
disposals.'
It may be noted in passing that the State Department had not been consulted over two
earlier disposals of chemical munitions' 8 and had first been approached "with respect to
specific action" on this occasion on 5 May 1969,' that is, 9 days before Dr. Pollack was
obliged to say in testimony that, "A decision on the exact procedure to be followed (in
notifying other States) has not yet been made."
However, between the House Hearings in May 1969 and the Senate Hearings in August
1970, an 'exact procedure' had been evolved. It is now provided, under Section 409(C)(2)
of Public Law 91-121, enacted in November 1969, that no funds shall be used for the
transportation and disposal of any lethal chemical warfare agent outside the United States if
14. Hearings on Int'l Implications of Dumping Poisonous Gas as Waste into Oceans
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
15. 1969 Hearings at 90-91.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 91.
18. Id. at 99.
19. Id. at 92.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. t11

the Secretary of State, after appropriate notice by the Secretary of Defense, determines that
such transportation and disposal will violate international law. The statute further requires
that the Secretary of State must report such a determination to the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and, to the extent required, to appropriate
international organizations.
Pursuant to these provisions, on 23 June 1970, the Army informed the State Department
of its decision to dump the nerve gas vaults as soon as possible; on 29 July 1970 the State
Department determined that the dumping would not violate international law and on 29
and 30 July 1970 "certain countries which had earlier expressed concern" were notified of
the dumping which was finally effected only 19 days later.
The Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department, Mr. Rhinelander, explained the basis
of the Department's legal determination in his testimony:
The disposal plan formulated by the Department of the Army was carefully
reviewed within the Department of State, including the possible effects of the
ocean dump on fishing, navigation, submarine cables, pipelines, exploitation of
the resources of the sea-bed and other uses of the sea.
Studies prepared by various experts were reviewed. In addition, Department of
Defense experts were questioned in detail on the possible impact of the proposed dump on use of the sea by other States.
Based on the information developed regarding the probable effects of the
ocean dump and the findings of the Surgeon General and the Department of
the Interior, the Acting Secretary of State concluded pursuant to Section
409(C)(2) of Public Law 91-121 that no basis had been found for a determination that the transport and disposal in question will violate international
2
law. 0
Curiously enough, Article 25(2) of the Geneva Convention was not referred to at all by
Mr. Rhinelander in his "discuss[ion of] the international legal aspects of the proposed"
operation. 2 Reference was made to the statutory need to report the State Department's
legal determination to appropriate international organizations, but even this was qualified
by the words "to the extent required." In citing the relevant international law, Mr. Rhinelander merely said:
Mr. Chairman, there is as yet no codified international law pertaining to
ocean dumping. Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas
sets forth the general principle of international law relevant to the proposed
plan,
and went on to explain its provisions.2 2
No question was asked in the Senate Hearings about notification to appropriate international organizations but the Acting Secretary of State, in reporting the State Department's findings on the legality of the proposed dumping, stated quite categorically that
"There is no requirement that I report this finding to any international organization." '2
The same apparent disinterest in the provisions of Article 25(2) was displayed in the
following exchanges in the earlier House Hearings: 2 4
Mr. Gallagher: ". ..The Article 2 to which you direct your response in effect
did not direct itself to Article 25. 1 now ask you what your interpretation
of Article 25 would be?"
20. 1970 Hearings at 65.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Letter from Acting Secretary of State to President of the Senate July 30, 1970,
pursuant to Public Law 91-121, § 409(c)(2) (LXIII Dept. of State Bull., No. 1628, Sept. 7,
1970, at 283).
24. 1969 Hearings at 94-95. (Mr. Gallagher was Chairman of the Sub-Committee and Mr.
Frank, Acting Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.)
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Mr. Frank: "My answer would be that Article 2 establishes a rule of reasonableness by which we would have to abide."
Mr. Gallagher: "Then the convention that we discussed, Article 25, would be
the applicable article that may or may not be involved in this discussion
here?"
Mr. Frank: "I would go a little further than that. You can say Article 25 is
relevant in that it requires co-operation with international organizations.
But I go beyond that and say that Article 2 requires reasonableness in what
we're doing. If it is unreasonable, then regardless of the co-operation we
can't do it. There would be a rule of international law that would inhibit
our doing it."
Thus, the State Department lawyers on both occasions seemed bent on virtually ignoring,
or at least playing down the significance of, Article 25(2), while emphasizing the coastal
State's role in determining unilaterally the reasonableness of its action.
This, then, is a suitable point at which to return to the Secretary-General's statement. In
addition to alleging the infringement of a General Assembly resolution, the SecretaryGeneral asserted that:
This decision also runs counter to the provisions of a clause (b) [i.e. Paragraph (2)] of Article 25 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
which reads as follows:
All states shall co-operate with the competent international organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas or
air space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive materials
or other harmful agents.2 '
It will be noted that the provision cited is Article 25(2) rather than 25(1). In view of the
restriction of Paragraph (1) to pollution by radioactive waste, there is no room for the
argument that the United States was under a conventional obligation to "take measures to
prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping of" other harmful agents, "taking into
account any standards and regulations which may be formulated by the competent international organizations." All that could be alleged was that, under Paragraph (2), the United
States had failed "to co-operate with the competent international organizations in taking
measures for the prevention of the pollution of the seas ...resulting from any activities
with... other harmful agents." The allegation is thus failure to co-operate with the
competent international organizations.
It can be argued that dependence on this rather imprecise provision is but a reflection of
the weakness of the Secretary-General's legal case, in that it is a little difficult to identify
clearly any organizations which, by virtue of their mandate or expertise, qualify as "the
competent international organizations" in relation to marine disposal of unwanted
munitions in general and of nerve gas in particular; and that what is involved in "co-operation" in this context is in any event very vague. On the other hand, given the considerable
recent activity in various international organizations and the United States' initiative
referred to earlier, there would certainly seem to be a clear obligation on the United States
to notify appropriate international institutions and to consult with them on the reasonableness of the operation and the adequacy of the planned safeguards. Lip service to this
requirement in the form of a statutory obligation to notify the result of a unilateral determination of the legality of the proposed operation to appropriate international organizations "to the extent required" and a belated notification to governments "which had earlier
expressed concern" hardly suffices.
Nor is it difficult to identify appropriate international organizations. As has been seen,26
a number of international organizations are actively accumulating scientific data to facilitate
the formulation of effective measures for the prevention and control of marine pollution
and work is proceeding on the development of a system which will probably include pro25. Supra note 12.
26. See main text Point III and notes 59, 63, 67, 69.
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vision for monitoring, registration of waste disposals and, possibly, standard-setting and
licensing. There can be no pretence, therefore, that there are no competent or no active
organizations in this field. FAQ is clearly competent in relation to the possible effect on
fisheries; and GESAMP is after all a group of experts on the scientific aspect of marine
pollution, already advising a number of agencies concerned with marine pollution-IAEA,
IMCO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO and WMO.
Finally, models for the kind of co-operation which is necessary are not wanting. Imperfect though they may be, the procedures observed by the ENEA States in their Atlantic
dumping of radioactive wastes at least allow for a hazard assessment by an international
team, for maintenance of internationally accessible records and for international monitoring
of the disposal site. 2 Such arrangements certainly help to engender more confidence in the
adequacy of hazard assessments and operational safeguards than the sort of unilateral determination made by the United States.
It is difficult, in the light of this record, to disagree with the Secretary-General's charge
that the United States' decision, or the manner of its implementation, ran counter to the
obligation laid down in Article 25(2) of the Geneva Convention.
As a somewhat sad postscript to this analysis, brief mention must be made of the role of
the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee. The Committee's terms of reference can probably
be stretched to cover this question (though under Paragraph 2(d) of General Assembly
Resolution 2467 A (XXIII) and under Resolution 2467 B (XXIII) it is more concerned with
pollution resulting from the exploration and exploitation of sea bed resources). In any
event, the Committee did concern itself with the question, devoting two plenary meetings to
consideration of a statement of concern on the issue. At the first of these two meetings on
18 August 1970 (the day of the dumping), the Committee considered a draft statement
which inter alia would have embodied the Committee's appeal to the Government of the
United States "to reconsider its decision and to refrain from any action that might cause
damage to the marine environment." 2" The "desirability to maintain the sense of co-operation so far prevailing in the Committee" 2 9 was apparently thought more important,
however, than the possibility of influencing the United States, and it was agreed to postpone
a decision "for one or two days." When the Committee reassembled on August 20, it was
thus able to adopt its statement with unanimity-but two days after the event. The statement included the following passages:
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor,
meeting in Geneva, today requested its Chairman to convey to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations its concern at the practice of using the seabed
and the ocean floor for the purpose of dumping toxic, radioactive and other
noxious materials, which has been brought to public attention by the decision,
since implemented, of the United States to dump a certain quantity of nerve
gas in the Atlantic Ocean.3
The Committee also deemed it opportune to address a general appeal to all
Governments to refrain from using the seabed and the ocean floor as a dumping ground for toxic, radioactive and other noxious materials which might
cause serious damage to the marine environment.
The Committee has noted the assurances given by the delegation of the United
States that effective precautions had been taken by the Government of the
United States to mitigate any harmful consequences arising from this particular action and that such action will not be taken again."'
27. Supra note 37.
28. Press Release SB/10, Aug. 18, 1970, at 2. The Provisional Summary Record of this
meeting (A/AC.138/SR.37) is less revealing and reproduces what appears to be a subsequent, watered-down, compromise draft.
29. Press Release SB/10.
30. Press Release SB/ll, Aug. 20, 1970, at 1.
31. Id. at 2.
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One of the few positive results of this affair is the assurance by the United States that
such action will not be taken again. It is however, questionable whether Mr. Stevenson
contributed to his Government's reputation for consistency by drawing the Committee's
attention to Article 9 of the United States draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area tabled in Geneva 15 days before the dumping. Under this article:
All activities in the International Seabed Area shall be conducted with strict
and adequate safeguards for the protection of human life and safety and of the
marine environment.
Mr. Stevenson's concern was to emphasize that this article provided that all activities in the
international seabed area-not just those of exploration and exploitation-should be so
conducted.
It is to be hoped that clear procedures for real international co-operation will be incorporated in a new treaty regime, as suggested above, and that compliance with such
procedures will come to be regarded as a necessary part of the strict and adequate safeguards
to which Mr. Stevenson referred.

